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1. Introduction
One afike commonly-accepted priflciples of software
design JOT security is thal making the source code openly
available leads to better security. The prf,sumption is
that the open publication of SOUTce code will/ead others
to review the code JOT eTTors. However, this openness
is no guarantee of correctness.
One of the most widely-published and used pieces
of security software in recent memOT1J is the MIT im-
plementation of the J(erberos authentication protocol.
In the design of the protocol, random session keys are
the basis for establishing the authenticity of service re-
quests. Because of the way that the J(erberos Version
4 implementation selecled its random keys, the secret
keys could easily be guessed in a matter of seconds.
This paper discusses the difficulty of generating good
random numbers, the mistakes that were made in im-
plementing Kerberos Version 4, and the breakdown of
soflware engineering that allowed this flaw to remain
unfixed for ten years. We discuss this as a particularly
notable example of the need to examine security-critical
code carefully, even when it is made publicly available.
• A version of tlLis paper is to IlppeM in the proceedings of the
1997 Intetnet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed
System Security.
As we depend more on computing for critical tasks,
the security of those systems becomes more significant.
Obviously, a key component of the security for those
systems is the underlying software that may run with
privilege or regulate access. To develop a strong sense
of trust in the underlying systems, we must establish
trust in the supporting software.
One of the key principles of deploying trustable soft-
ware is the concept of open design. (see the principles
described in [21] as reprinted in [7], and the comments
about "no security through obscurity" in [9].) This
principle states that code - and especially security-
critical code - should not depend on the secrecy of
the code or algorithm. Code and algorithms can be
accidentally disclosed or reverse-engineered, so any se-
curity implied by keeping that secret is transitory at
best. Furthermore, the assumption is that by pub-
lishing security-critical code, others can examine it for
flaws and gain confidence in the correctness of the code
and the strength of the algorithm.
Although this principle suggest a necessary condi-
tion, it is not a sufficient one: It is also necessary that
the code be examined carefully and critically by trained
observers. Merely making source code available does
not, by itself, add any confidence in the underlying
correctness of the code. As noted in [6], even Cormal
prooCs of correctness require critical review over time
to gain any validity.
Unfortunately, having code available for public
scrutiny has often resulted in a false sense of security
in thaL code by its users. What is more, as time goes
on, this sense often increases - the belief is that if no
problems have yet been discovered, that the passage
of time increases the likelihood that no problems exist.
Recent trends in software development, where flaws are
often discovered in software within days (or hours!) of
release on the Internet tend to exacerbate this overall
problem with legacy software developed and released
in earlier times.
In the remainder of this paper we examine a partic-
ularly notable example of Lhis overall problem of mis-
placed trust: the generation of "random" numbers in
Kerberos 4. We will begin with a review of the use
of random numbers in secure applications, and then
discuss the problem in the Kerberos 4 implementation.
2. The Importance of Random Numbers
Random means that, among other things, it should
be impossible to guess the next value based on knowl-
edge of past values. This can be achieved in a pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG) only if it is based
on cryptographic principals and is seeded with a suf-
ficient amount of entropy, or truly random informa-
tion. A pseudo-random number generator is a function
that generates a predictable sequence of numbers that
passes certain statistical tests for randomness. True
random number generators (RNG) also satisfy tests for
randomness but they are not predictable. For cryp-
tography it is desirable to usc a truly random num-
ber generator, such as one based on measurements of
unpredictable physical phenomena, such as radioactive
decay.
The following are characteristics of a cryptograph-
ically secure random number for secret keys I. The
sequence of random numbers should pass standard sta-
tistical tests for randomness. 2. The sequence should
be unpredictable. Knowing the algorithm and the pre-
vious sequence items should not allow the next item
in the sequence to be determined. 3. The sequence
can not be reliably reproduced. If the generator is run
twice with the same initial conditions, you will get two
difference sequences.
The UNIX random number implementations rand,
random and lrand48 were designed to produce com-
pletely reproducible random number streams, violating
properties two and three of cryptographically secure
random numbers. These functions produce random
number sequences for statistical purposes, like random
events in computer simulations. They were never in-
tended to generate cryptographically secure random
numbers.
Examples of how to develop secure random-sequence
numbers are available in RFC 1750 [8], Knuth [13],
Schneier [22, pages 421-428] and Garfinkel and Spafford
[9, pag" 726-731].
2.1. Key Entropy
Entropy, in the cryptographic sense, is the amount
of information that a message contains [22, page 233].
The entropy of a random key is the number of bits
required to represent all possible keys. Ideally, the en-
tropy of a key is equal to its length. In other words,
every single bit is completely random and independent
of every other bit in the key.
Entropy is the deciding factor in how difficult keys
are to guess. If the entropy is not equal to thc size of
the key, then some keys are more likely to be chosen
than others. This statistical lack of randomness can
be exploited to reduce the average number of keys that
have to be tested before the actual key is found. For
example, if there are 134 possible keys, but only the even
numbers are used, then the entropy of anyone key is
only 5 bits (32 keys used is 25 ) even though the key is
6 bits long, because the lowest order bit is always zero.
In this case, the number of keys that need to be tried
to guess the kcy by brute force is halved. This might
seem like an absurd example, but the UNIX random
and rand functions both leave the highest-order bit
zero so that the negative numbers are ncver returned,
reducing the entropy.
2.2. Common KnOWledge
While the computer security community as a whole
considers the need for good random number generators
common knowledge, the fact that this problem contin-
ues to appear indicates that this is still a major chal-
lenge confronting the cryptography community.
Little effort has been expended to make good ran-
dom number generators available to implementors of
cryptographic protocols. There is no standard mecha-
nism in operating systems (OS), hardware, or appli-
cations for generating satisfactory, cryptographically
strong random numbers. While RFC 1750 [8] pro-
vides excellent advice on where random information
might reside on a computer, little practical information
is given. In fact, nearly all of the suggested sources
of good random entropy are impossible to collect on
modern OSs. Everything that is a potential source of
randomness is insulated by abstraction and high level
interfaces. For some operating sustems this is more of
a problem than others. For example, the Java OS [17],
takes abstraction to the extreme. There is no way to
access memory locations directly, all input/outpuL is
only done through drivers written in Java, and there
is no way Lo gel. dired access to system statistics. The
Java PlaLform [15J provides yet another difficulty, this
defines the minimal Java API that can be safely as-
sumed to exist on any Java machine. The existence of
hard drives, or other hardware that could be a source
of randomness cannot be presumed.
As suggested in RFC 1750 [8} the user is a good
source of randomness. People rarely exhibit determin-
istic behavior and thus provide a good source of en-
tropy. However, people sleep even if their computers
do not. Tf computers can only get entropy from a user's
input, what is the computer to do when the user leaves
his terminal? Are random keys to be more secure when
the user is present at Lhe keyboard versus when the user
goes on vacaLion for a week? What about servers that
never have users directly logged into them? Or fire-
walls that implement virtual private networks? Most
firewalls are designed to not support direct user con-
nections. Or what about the Internet appliances of the
future? These devices will have very limited user inter-
faces. Should users of the future be e.xpected to open
and close their refrigerator door 1000 times while the
refrigerator collects entropy? User input is a limited
resource that cannot be counted on.
AnoLher method for producing secure random num-
bers is to seed a PRNG with a local sccret key. This
is the heart of the Kerberos Version 5 random number
generator. This works for I{erberos Version 5, because
to guess the seed (and thus the state) of the RNG one
must first guess the local secret key of the Kerberos
server. Of course, if you know the Kerberos ticket
granting server (TGS) key, then you do not necd to
be able to guess session keys, because you can sim-
ply creatc your own tickets. Thus the RNG is equally,
if not slightly more secure than the TGS secret key,
which is as it should be. However, there is a boot-
strapping problem for this technique in general. What
happens if the master key, in this case the TGS key, is
generated at random using the same RNG? IIow is the
RNG seeded? If there is some other unsecure method
for seeding the RNG, then the master key is not truly
a secret, and the whole system is vulnerable.
2.3. Algorithm Analysis
While cryptographic protocols and encryption algo-
rithms are subjected to great scrutiny, RNGs rarely
arc. Protocols are closely studied for weaknesses, and
sometimes proven to be secure. The use of random
nonces and randomly chosen keys are frequent com-
ponent of such protocols but their correctness is taken
for granted. There arc no formal methods for analyzing
the entropy of key data.
For example, Bellovin and Merritt examined several
problems in the Kerberos protocol in Limitations of the
J(erberos Authentication System [2]. These weaknesses
in the protocol included replay attacks, secure time ser-
vices, password-guessing attacks, and login spoofing.
However, they did not address issues of protocol im-
plementation, such as key randomness in their work.
This excellent analysis of the protocol, demonstrates
the community's focus on the theoretical vulnerability
of systems.
3. Introduction to Kerberos
Kerberos is a secret key network authentication pro-
tocol [20] designed at MIT for Project Athena. It is
based on the Needham-Schroeder [18] authentication
protocol. The goals of Kerberos are authentication,
authorization, and accounting. Some of the protocol
requirements are that authentication be two-way, no
cleartext passwords be transmitted over the net, no
cleartext passwords be stored on servers, clients use
cleartext passwords for the shortest time possible, au-
thentication have a limited lifetime, and authentication
be transparent to the user.
The basic "currency" of the Kerberos authentica-
tion protocol is a credential or capability known as a
ticket. The possession of a tickeL and its accompany-
ing session key determines the ability to use a service.
The protocol includes the use of time stamps and iden-
tification strings (known as authenticators) to prevent
replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. It also includes
the ability to use encryption for message authentication
and message secrecy.
4. Kerberos Authentication Protocol
I{erberos is a trusted authenticaLion protocol de-
signed for TCP lIP neLworks. The protocol is described
in J(erberos: An Authentication Service for Open Net-
work Systems [23] and Applied Cryptography [22, pages
566-571]. In the descriptions below, Lhe principal and
the client denoted by C are the user. The Kerberos
server is also called the Key Distribution Center and
is denoted by KDC. The Ticket Granting Server which
grants tickets to service principals is denoted by TGS.
The service principals are services such as file systems,
printers, remote command execution (rsh), remote lo-
gin (rlogin) and e-mail gateways and are denoted by
S. The exchange between the client and the Kerberos
server is called the Authentication Service (AS). In the
implementation, the KDC and the TGS are integrated
in the Kerberos server process.
The following notation is used:
• [(, denotes a secret key owned by agent a.
• J(a,b denotes a session key shared by agents a and
b.
• Ta,. is a ticket granting agent a access to service,.
• A" is an authenticator containing the name of
client c.
• {M}K is message M enciphered with key K.
5. Kerberos Session Key Generation
Kerberos makes use of random session keys for au-
thenticating transactions. Knowledge of these secret
keys is used as proof of identity and for verifying the
authenticity of messages. The secrecy of these keys is
paramount to the integrity of the Kerberos system. If
one of the keys is compromised then anything authen-
ticated by that key cannot be trusted.
The following sections describe how and when the
various versions and implementations of Kerberos gen-
erate secret keys.
5.1. Kerberos Version 4 RNG
Figure 1. Kerberos Authentication Steps
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The session key generation code is implemented in
src/lib/des/randomltey. c in the Kerberos Version 4
source code hierarchy. The randomltey. c code is fairly
straightforward. A pseudo random number generator
is seeded each time a session key is generated with the
following information bitwise exclusive or'd (XOR):
1. time-of-day seconds since UTe 0:00 Jan. 1, 1970
2. process ID of the Kerberos server process
3. cumulative count of session keys generated
1. fractional part of time-of-day seconds since UTC
0:00 Jan. I, 1970 in microseconds
5. hostid of the machine on which the Kerberos server. .
IS runDing
4.1. Version 4 Protocol
The Kerberos Version 4 protocol consists of nve
steps in which the client, C, communicates to the Ker-
beros server, KDC, to get a Ticket Granting Ticket. It
then communicates with the Ticket Granting Service,
TGS, to get a Ticket to a service principal. Finally, it
communicates with the service principal, S. Figure 1 is
a pidorial view of the authentication protocol.
1. C -+ KDC: c, tgs
2. KDC --+ C: {K",lg., {T",lg.}Klg.}J("
3. C -+ TGS: s, {T",tgs}J(lg., {Ae}K",lg.
4. TGS -+ C: {{Te,s}J(., [(",.} Te,lg.
5. C --+ S: {A"}K,,, .. {Te,.}](.
The random session keys are 1(",lg. and K e,. and
the ticket granting authority's secret key is J(Ig•. The
ticket is denoted by T and A is an authenticator.
Kerberos Version 4 uses the UNIX random function
to produce the random DES keys. Kcrberos generates
a random DES key by first seeding the random num·
ber generator with a. seed chosen as outlined in above,
then it makes two calls to the random function to get 64
pseudo-random bits. This 64-bit block has every eighth
bi.t set as a parity bit, leaving a 56-bit DES key. The
random fundion relies on a 32-bit seed value to deter-
mine the state of the linear feedback shift register used
for generating the pseudo random numbers. The seed
is composed as described above. Thus, any sequence
of numbers created by the random function, no matter
holY long, relics solely on the 32-bit seed value. The en-
tropy of any number sequence produced by random()
has an entropy of only 32 bits. Likewise the Kerberos
session keys have an entropy of only 32 bits.
The only component of the seed that significantly
changes between successive key generations is the mi-
croseconds value. This yields a key entropy of about 20
bits (106). Other components such as the seconds, the
cumulative count of keys generated, and the process
ID only affect the low-order bits. Because these values
are XOR'd together any entropy that might have been
gained from the other values is washed out by the mi-
croseconds value. Unlike the low-order 20 bits, the first
twelve bits rarely change and are predictable. This can
be seen graphically in Figure 2.








_ Predictable Bits 11III Unprediclable Bits
Figure 2. Random Number Generator Seed
As a result of this poor choice in seed values, given
knowledge of the approximate time that a key was gen-
crated, there are only about 220 (or approximately one
million) possible keys.
6. Guessing Random Keys
This sedion describes the process of guessing Ker-
beros random keys and discusses how to exploit these
weak keys.
6.1. The Naive Brute Force Method
A brute force attack on a key is an exhaustive search
of all possible key values until the correct one is found.
Brute force attacks typically require a known plaintext
and ciphertext pair enciphered with the desired key.
The known plaintext is used to identify when the cor-
rect key is found. Ideally, the size and entropy of the
key is such that it takes a very long time, on the order
of 1010 years or more, to try all possible keys.
Finding DES keys by brute force has been a hot
topic of discussion in the cryptography world. DES
keys are 56 bits long and since the adoption of the
Data Encryption Standard in 1981, the time and ex-
pense required to discover a DES key by brute force
has been reduced to alarmingly easy levels. For exam-
ple, it is estimated that 56-bit keys could be broken
in an average of 3.5 hours with $1 million of special
hardware [3].
Kerberos uses DES for authentication and encrypt-
ing its tickets and session traffic. Someone with enough
computing resources, as stated above, could brute force
session keys in about 3.5 hours, which is within the life-
time of these keys, and use them. This assumes that
the 56-bit DES session keys arc chosen completely at
random and that the entropy of the keys is 56 bits. In
practice, Version 4 falls short of this goal. Each session
key has an entropy much smaller than 56 bits. The re-
sult is that Version 4 keys are relatively easy to guess
using an intelligent brute force attack.
6.2. Brute Forcing Seed Values
The brute force met.hod can be scaled down from
256 possible DES keys to the 232 possible seed values
used to generate the keys. This reduces the search
by a factor of 224 (or roughly 17 million times). The
weakness lies in the fact that the entropy of the DES
key cannot excede the entropy of the seed value used
to create it. Because the seed is only 32 bits long, the
entropy of the resulting keys cannot be more than 32
bits.
Estimated average time to search the 232 possible
seed values is about 28 hours on a SPARe 5 and 6
hours on a DEC Alpha. Although 28 hours is longer
than the 21 hour lifespan of I{erberos tickets and the
5 minute lifespan of the authenticators, it is still well
within the lifetime of other secret keys used by Ker-
beros services. If the seed itself is not truly random,
then the number of seeds that must be tried can reduce
the time to search the entire key space.
6.3. Educated Guessing of Seed Values
Trying to guess all possible 232 seed values produces
a tremendous savings in time over guessing a full DES
key. However, without resorting to using paralleliza-
tion or supercomputers, session keys and encrypted
tickets will expire before they can be successfully de-
crypted. The solution is to exploit the lack of entropy
in the seed values.
Table 1 gives ~he amoun~ of en~ropy, in bi~s, ~ha~
exists in each componen~ of ~he random seed. Because
all ~he nonpredictable bi~s are loca~ed in ~he low-order
posi~ion of each seed componen~ and ~he values are
XOR'ed ~ogether, ~he ~o~al en~ropy of the seed is equal
to that of the component wi~h ~he larges~ entropy. Fig-
ure 2 shows how ~he seed value is formed.
Seed Component Insider Outsider
time (seconds) 0 0
process ID 0 510
nUDlber of keys 0 510
time (Dlicroseconds) 20 20
hostid 0 20
Total Unknown bits 20 20
Table 1. Entropy of seed components.
It is startling to observe ~ha~ an inside altacker who
has access to the machine on which the Kerberos server
is running does not gain any information aboll~ the
seed value. This is because the values of the process
id, hostid, number of keys generated, and current time
are all obfuscated by ~he time in microseconds value.
Thus an ou~side attacker that knows nothing about the
machine running the Kerberos server generating the
keys is at no disadvantage when it comes to guessing
the final seed values.
The hostid is credited with 20 or fewer bi~s of en"
tropy. This is because the top 12 bits can easily he
determined. If the hostid value is not known, then
the whole 32-bit seed value must be brute forced once.
With this seed value the top 12 bits of the hostid can
be determined by XOR'ing the seed with the time in
seconds of when ~he key was generated.
This method takes advantage of the the low entropy
of the seed values used to gencratc the J{erberos keys.
With only 20 bits of entropy in each seed, there are
only 220 possible seed values and therefore only 220
possible Kerberos keys used. Searching this key space
can be accomplished in seconds on common works~a­
tions or pes. Using this method keys can be guessed
sufficiently fas~ enough so that Kerberos session keys
will not have expired and can, therefore, be exploited.
6.4. Precomputation Attacks
A precomputation attack can be used to reduce the
Lime for finding individual keys at the expense of some
initial computation and storage.
To launch a pTccomputation attack on Kerberos Ver-
sion 1, all possible seed values are determined given the
set of conditions under which the targeted key will he
generated. Wi~h knowledge of the approximate time
and the hostid of the Kerberos server, only the low-
order 20 hits of the seed arc unknown. This means that
there arc 220 possible seed values that could be used
to generate a key. Because changes in the low-order 20
bits of the seconds value are obscured by changes in
the milliseconds value, ~his set of seed values is valid
for 220 seconds, or approximately 12 days.
All 220 possible keys are generated and used to en-
cipher a known plaintext. The known plaintext is ~he
userid of the targeted victim. The resu[tan~ encrypted
blocks are stored with their respective keys and sorted
by the encrypted blocks. Once a Kerberos ~ransaction
occurs on the network ~hat contains one of these en-
crypted blocks, we can discover the key used by search-
ing the table of preencrypted plaintext blocks and rcad-
ing out the respective key.
The storage requirements for some precomputation
attacks can be very large. For example storing all pos-
sible DES encryptions of a fixed block requires over I
billion gigabytes of storage. However, in the ca'3C of
Kerberos Version 4 there are only about 1 million pos-
sible keys per 12 day period. Each entry in the lookup
table needs only 12 bytes, 8 for the encryp~ed block
and 4 for the seed value. The entire lookup table can
be stored in 12 Megabytes.
7. Results
This section describes the results from our work. Ta-
ble 2 shows the results (in seconds) for guessing Ker-
beros Version 4 randomly generated keys. These re-
sults apply to non-parallclized C code running on a
single workstation. The times and statistics presented
here are the product of successrully gathering Kerberos
ciphertext and guessing ~he DES session key of 400 dif-
ferent Kerberos au~hentication sessions.






standm:d deviation 13.9 3.1
Table 2. Statistics for guessing a single Ker-
beros key.
The majori~y of the time needed to guess each key
was spent perrorming DES decryptions of the cipher-
tex~. All DES operations werc done in sof~ware, using
~he libdes library. The ~es~s on ~he DEC machine did
no~ ~ake advan~age of the Alpha's 64-bi~ archi~edure,
sugges~ing ~ha~ fas~er times are possible with 64-bit
optimized DES code. Using hardware implementations
of DES is another source of potential performance im-
provements.
Regardless of what o~her optimiza~ions that might
be made, these times for guessing keys are sufficiently
fast to be a threat to the security of any system de-
pending on Kerberos Version 1. IIowever, a precompu-
tation attack stands out as an easy, low-cost method
for improving performance.
7.1. Precompute Attack
Using the same database of about 400 randomly gen-
erated Kerberos keys used for testing the brute force
method, our average time to find one key using the
precomputation method was about 710 microseconds
on a SPARCStation 5. The time to generate the table
of ciphertext and seed values was approximately 2.5
minutes and sorting the table took about 5 minutes
(both values are for a SPARCStation 5.) The time re-
quired for table generation and sorting is a cost that
only needs to be repeated once every 12 days when the
top 12 bits of the seed value changes.
8. Vulnerable Keys
Random numbers arc used in Kerberos in many
places. They arc used as randomly generated session
keys to encrypt traffic between the client and a Ker-
beros server. In addition, the random numbers are used
for random keys for principals and servers in the Ker-
beros database. In particular, the krblgt and changcpw
principals have random keys. These two principals play
important roles in the administration of the I(erberos
authentication system. Compromising these keys sub-
verts the security of the whole system.
Any key that is created using the Version 4.
random..key code is vulnerable to guessing. These
keys include all session keys generated by the I(DC
server and keys generated for the initial Kerberos
database. Weak database keys include the Ticket
Granting Server's secret key. This server key is used to
generate the Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGT).
Once the TGS key is guessed, that key can be used to
generate TGT to obtain access to any service that is
regulated by that TGS, including administrative com-
mands to the Kerberos server itself.
9. Exploiting Weak Keys
The discovery of the weakness in the implementation
of the Kerberos Version 4 random number generation
undermines the security of the Kerberos authentication
protocol.
9.1. Snooping Encrypted Traffic
When the session key between the user and the ser-
vice (J(e,.) is guessed, encrypted traffic between the
user and the server is vulnerable to snooping. En-
crypted traffic that is "sniITed" and saved is especially
vulnerable to disclosure at a later time, once the session
key is guessed.
9.2. Masquerading as Another User
When the Ticket Granting Server secret key (J(TGS)
is guessed, then valid Ticket Granting Tickets can be
fabricated without the step of client authentication to
the Kerberos server. The Ticket Granting Ticket also
contains a session key (J(e,TGS) that is used to encrypt
an authenticator. These Ticket Granting Tickets can
then be presented to the TGS requesting access to a
service that the user would not normally be granted
by the legitimate KDC.
10. Related Work
There have been other incidents of attacks on secu-
rity systems by exploiting weaknesses in the random
number generation routines. In addition, the available
patches and fi.xcs from Kerberos vendors arc listed.
10.1. Net.'icape SSL Random Number Guessing At-
tack
The Netscape SSL random number generation vul-
nerability received a great deal of coverage in the media
because of Netscape's high visibility. The publicity of
this bug was one of the motivations that prompted the
authors to examine the Kerberos RNG. The Netscape
vulnerability was very similar in nature to the weakness
in Kcrberos Version 1. Netscape used known, deter"
ministic components to seed the random number gen-
erator. The Netscape SSL random number guessing at-
tack as described by Goldberg and Wagner [10). More
information is available on the World Wide Web [5].
10.2.XlI MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-I Random Num-
ber Attack
The MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-l random number gen-
eration vulnerability was originally discovered by Chris
Hall [11] and was discussed in the Best-of-Security
mailing list [25]. This is another instance of a poorly
implemented random number generation routine used
for security purposes. In this case, the random Dumber
generator is seeded with the time of day and the process
id of the xdm client. Hall also noted that if the DES
routines were not compiled into the Xll code, then
for some operating systems only 256 possible random
magic cookies are generated.
When the magic cookie is guessed, it can be added
to the aUacker's .Xauthority file (or wherever the at-
tacker keeps his magic cookies). This gives the attacker
the ability to connect to the display of the victim. At
this point, any of the standard XlI attacks can occur.
These include killing X server processcs, faking input
on behalf of the victim, and even capturing the victim's
keystrokes (which might include passwords).
11. Other Implementations of Kerberos
I<erheros has been widely successful and imitat.ed.
There is a risk in copying the design of a system too
closely, in that the bugs can also be duplicated. For
such an "obvious" fiaw, the RNG bug found its way
into a surprising number of Kerberos Version 4's de-
scendants.
11.1. Kerberos Version 5
A notable exception to the inheritance of the RNG
bug is Kerberos Version 5. The new version of Kerberos
uses the random number generator that was meant to
be adopted by Version 4. years ago. Instead of using the
UNIX random function, Version 5 uses the DES encryp-
tion algorithm as a mixing function. The state from
previous key generations is kept as a seed for generat-
ing the next. key. In addition, some local information
and the time of day is mLxed in to add to the entropy.
What makes this random number generator strong is
that it is initially seeded with the TGS's secret. key.
One potential vulnerability of Kerberos Version 5 is
the Version 4 backward compatibility mode. This is
not a problem though because the new RNG is used.
11.2. SESAME
SESAME is a European Community security project
that implements authentication and key exchange. It
uses the Needham-Schroeder protocol like Kerberos
along with public-key cryptography. According to
Schneier [22, page 572], the SESAME key generation
algorilhm consists of two calls to the UNIX rand func-
tion, similar to the Kerberos Version 4 algorithm. This
yields the same upper bound of 232 possible values for
the seed and resulting key. However, SESAME docu-
mentation available on the Web indicates that some of
the SESAME components are accessible through the
Kerberos V5 protocol (as specified in RFC 1510), and
would use Kerberos data structures [14]. The architects
of SESAME explained that Schneier's criticisms were
based on exportable versions of the code using XOR,
not. the real code which uses DES encryption [16].
The random number generation code in SESAME
V~, recent.ly released to the public, is more secure than
as described in Schneier's book. The algorithm takes
the time in seconds, the process id, the number of clock
ticks since last reboot, some constants, and mixes them
up using shifting and exclusive or functions. This is
then diffused through MD5.
11.3. Cygnus Network Security
Cygnus Kerberos, also known as Cygnus Network
Security (CNS), is based on MIT Kerberos Version 4.
and exhibits the same vulnerabilities. Further exacer-
bating the problem in CNS, for many platforms, the
hostid command is not used as a component of the
seed. These platforms include Linux, SCQ, HP-UX,
and Sun Solaris. When the hostid is not included as a
component of the seed, the only component that deter-
mines the first 12 bits of the seed is the time in seconds
since 1970. Without the usage of the hostid, guessing
the key by an outsider is made easier by eliminating
the need to determine the hostid either by brute forc-
ing the entire seed value once to determine the top 12
bits or by social engineering.
11.4. Other Commercial Versions
OSF DCE Version 1.1 contains Kerberos Version 5.
Vendors include BP, IBM, DEC, Qpen*Vision Tech-
nologies and Sun. Transarc claims their AFS prod-
uct, which is based on J<erheros Version 1, was fixed
in 1990. They claim tlleir DeE and Encina products
are not vulnerable to this key guessing attack. Cyber-
Safe sells primarily Kerberos Version 5, but they also
sell products based on Kerberos Version 4. CyberSafe
claims they fixed the problem with Version 4 more than
a year ago.
Another product built on the Kerberos Version 5
authentication protocol is NetCheque [19]. It is be-
ing developed a~ ~he University of Sou~hern California
Information Sciences Institute. One of the primary de-
velopers is B. CliITord Neuman who was also one of the
primary developers of Kerberos. Because it is based
on I<erberos Version 5, i~ does no~ suffer from a poor
random number generator.
12. Patches and Fixes
Since the public release of information pertaining to
the I<erberos Version 4 random number generation vul-
nerability, many vendors have released patches. MIT
has released a patch that replaces all calls to the weak
random number generation routine wi~h calls to the
I{erberos Version 5 random number generation rou-
tine. Ins~ructions to download the patch are avail-
able via anonymous ftp from athena-dist .mit. edu
in the Ipub/kerberos directory. This will install
changes to various Kerberos modules to upgrade them
to use des..neW'...xandom..key(). It also will install a new
program, fix..kdb..keys. The fix..kdb..keys program,
which runs on the KDC server, will update the krbtgt
and changpw keys to new values using the new random
number generator. The only client program modified
is ksrvutil which is used to generate new server keys.
All other client/server programs are unaffected.
Cygnus has fixed their version of I{erberos Version 4
(Cygnus Network Security) and is releasing an updated
dis~ribution to their customers. The patched version
uses the secure random number generator previously
distributed, but never properly used. All randomly
generated keys (including session keys, and the krbtgt
and changepw service principal keys) now have more
than 20 bits of entropy. Because CNS is based on MIT
Kerberos Version 4, the CNS pa~ch does the same thing
as the MIT patch, except without the fix..kdb..keys
program. More information is available from their Web
site at http://W.W.W..cygnus.com.
EP has released a pa~ch for their DCE prod-
uct based on Kerberos Version 5. This information
is available in the Hewlett-Packard Security Bulle~in
HPSBUX960'·030 [l'J.
There are several solutions to the vulnerability we
have described. The most basic solu~ion is to install
~he patch for Version tl and to make sure that all ran-
dom keys generated with ~he flawed random number
generator are destroyed. The next recommended so-
lution is to migrate to Kerberos Version 5, which does
no~ suffer from the vulnerability outlined in this paper.
13. What Went Wrong and Why
It is surprising that the RNG bug in Kerberos Ver-
sion 4 existed for so long. The cause is purely a social
engineering failure. The bug was known to the devel-
opers bu~ somehow never got fixed in the end product.
13.1. What Went Wrong
In HISS Ted Anderson noticed that there was an
alarmingly high collision rate with keys generated by
the Kerberos RNG [IJ. What he noticed was that after
genera~ing a table of 170 thousand unique keys, every
key generated after that had approximately a one in
five chance of already being in the table. If one extrap-
olates these data one gets a key space of only about 850
thousand (or 219.7 ) keys. This implies that ~here arc
only about 19.7 hits of en~ropy in the each key, very
close to ~he 20 bits of entropy that were determined by
analyzing the RNG code.
One suggestion that Anderson made to fix this prob-
lem was to initialize the RNG only once, instead of with
every call to the RNG, increasing the number ofpossi-
ble keys generated to 231 . This would force an attacker
attemp~ing to guess I<erberos keys to keep track of how
many keys had been generated. This 1V0uld actually de-
crease the entropy of of the keys because ~he method
for choosing ~he initial seed was not changed. If imple-
mented, guessing the entire key stream would be only
slightly harder ~han guessing jus~ one key from ~he old
RNG. ThanHully, there is no sign that this "fix" was
ever in~roduced to the I<erheros source release.
It was not until a year later that new code was added
to improve the RNG. Even then, the problem was not
solved. While the new code was technically superior
and much more secure, i~ was never utilized. This new
RNG was eventually carried over to the new Kerheros
Version 5 project and correctly used, however in Ver-
sion 4 ~he new RNG went unused until 1996 when a
security patch was released.
13.2. Why
Because code had been checked in that was sup-
pose to have fixed the RNG, everyone assumed that it
worked. The documen~ationsupported this idea; ~here
was a new module called nell'...rnd..key. e and e-mail
stating that the bug had been fixed was posted to the
I<erberos developers' mailing list. IIowever, in actual-
ity, the bug was still there.
The circumstances that allowed this to happen were
a breakdown in the social and software engineering pro-
cesses. In 1989, the Kerberos Version 4 project was
drawing to a close. People who formerly worked on
Kerberos Version 4 development. were migrating to the
Version 5 projed. The code review and qualily control
processes for Version 4 simple broke down for lack of
attention and staffing. Clearly, no one attempted to
verify that t.he fIx worked, because if they had they
would have discovered that. t.he old RNG was st.ill be-
ing used. To make matters worse, owners of checked
in code were responsible for gdt.ing their own code re-
viewed. The owner of t.he RNG bug fix code was, for
some reason, unsuccessful in getting his new code prop-
erly reviewed.
The perseverance of this bug can be attributed to
several fadors including poor code legibility, obfus-
cated function calls, and leftover dead code. Anyone
who has looked at the Kerberos RNG code, new or
old, can testify that the code is difficult to follow, de-
spite the straight-forward algorithms. To make matters
worse the function names of the RNG are renamed with
a #define in one of the included header files. Thus
anyone searching for the name of the RNG function
would never find where it is called, unless they knew
the function had been renamed. Finally, the existence
of old legacy code made it possible for the incorrect
function calls to continue to work and go undiscovered.
13.3. Lessons Learned
The important lesson to be learned here is that soft-
ware engineering is important. If code reviews had
been more strictly enforced or regression testing had
been performed, this bug would have died back in 1989.
Communication and social skills are also important to
the success of projects [4). Perhaps if the communica-
tion between the writer of the new random number gen-
erator and the rest of the development team had been
better, his code would have been reviewed more care-
fully and installed properly. It is not sufficient to have
brilliant programmers that can write excellent code;
they must. also possess the social skills to see that their
code gets properly integrated.
13.4. Timeline of Events
The following is a reconstruction of the timeline of
events surrounding the Kerberos Version 4 RNG prob-
lems.
• Sept 1988, Ted Anderson points out the problems
in the random..key() routine (1]
• Jan 1989, John Kohl checks in the new RNG code
to the Kerberos source tree, but is never used.
• Mar 1991, Ted Ts'o encourages users of Kerberos
to review the source code [24]:
We encourage people to at least look
over the source code of what they FTP
over; and if they want to, they're per-
fectly welcome to perform a security au-
dit over the code.
• Jun 1991, Kerberos Version 5 public beta is an-
nounced.
• 1992, Ted Ts'o makes the first reference to the new
RNG code in the get..srvlab administration utility.
• Oct 1995, Steve Lodin rediscovers the usage of the
bad RNG in Kerberos Version 4.
• Jan 1996, Bryn Dole joins the team to write the
code exploiting the bad RNG.
• Jan 1996, Gene Spafford sends an e-mail to the
COAST sponsors about the potential vulnerability
in Kerberos Version 4.
• Feb 1996, Gene Spafford sends a similar e-mail to
the FIRST members.
• Feb 1996, various vendors start distributing
patches to fix the Version 4 RNG.
• Feb 1996, the Wall Street Journal prints an arti-
cle about the Kerberos Version 4 RNG weakness,
followed by many additional articles in trade mag-
aZines.
14. Conclusion
The method that Kerberos Version 4 used to gen-
erate random keys for services and session keys was
flawed. The mistake was that the random number gen-
erator used was not cryptographically secure. Pseudo-
random number generators are not sufficiently random
for secure keys because they are too deterministic and
predictable. This predictability makes guessing keys
from a pseudo-random number generator much easier
than attempting to naively brute force the entire key
space. In the case of Kerberos Version 4, keys can be
gu~cd in seconds, allowing an attacker to make use of
the key and subvert the Kerberos authentication sys-
tem.
Many security experts are proponents of forcing
computer security developers to open their algorithms,
designs and source code for review. Programs like PGP
are available in source form and some vendors have
their code reviewed by outside experts in the field.
SWl, many developers do not in an attempt to pro-
tect their intellectual property or in an attempt to seek
security through obscurity. Peer review might have
caught some past implementation flaws, such as the
flaw in the Netscape SSL random number generator.
However, Kerberos serves as a testament that public
peer review is not a perfect solution.
During its lifetime Kerberos has been studied, mod-
ified, cleaned up, and ported to a number of operat-
ing system systems. Public scrutiny is no substitute
for structured code reviews, good software engineering
practices and quality testing. More significantly, users
should bear in mind that public availability of source
code does not imply public scrutiny. Code that is badly
structured, poorly written, frequently modified, and in-
sufficiently documented may not be scrutinized at all.
While the Kerbcros protocol, which is based on
Needham-Schroeder authentication, is fundamentally
sound, the Kerberos Version 4 implementation of the
protocol was faulty. This suggests that the computer
security community may spend too much time validat-
ing algorithms and too little time verifying implemen-
tations. This should serve as a warning to security
developers everywhere.
Also, contrary to popular belief, RNG vulnerabili-
ties are not old news. This problem is still with us and
the more we attempt to trivialize it, the more it will
be overlooked and come back to haunt us. Hardware
and operating system designers do not understand the
need for good random number generators and do not
implement them. Knowledgeable cryptographers are
then forced to make concessions to support portabil-
ity and reliability of their code. Meanwhile, designers
oblivious to the nuances of the field of cryptography
are left to invent more poor RNGs or use the woefully
inadequate system calls that are provided them. Either
way, we are Ii.kely to see the past repeat itself until we
have some real random numbers provided at the oper-
ating system level. The only way to do that is to add
specialized hardware to every motherboard or CPU.
We hope that by documenting this vulnerability, the
flawed design and the errors made when fixing the bug,
that this can serve as an cxample and warning. We
hope to raise the awareness of the importance that ran-
dom numbers and software engineering play in creating
secure programs.
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